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Summary
This study explores the impact of income taxation on the allocation of non-
market time by households. Using data from the Michigan Survey of Income
Dynamics for 1976, a home production equation is estimated for husbands and wives.
The results of the study suggest that one effect of taxation is to encourage the
home production activity of wives and discourage that of husbands. The implica-
tions of this finding for tax policy are discussed.

TAXATION AND THE ALLOCATION OF NON-MARKET TIME
The purpose of this study is to measure the influence of the in-
dividual income tax on the allocation of time to non-market activities.
The focus of this study is on the home production activities of house-
holds, specifically housework and child care. A model of household time
allocation is developed and estimated using data from the Michigan
Survey of Income Dynamics for 1976. The important influences on the
allocation of time are identified and the hypothesis that income taxa-
tion affects non-market activity is tested. It is found that taxation
tends to encourage the home production activity of wives but tends to
discourage the home production activity of husbands.
This study is a departure from the earlier work in the area of home
production behavior of households. One of the earliest studies in the
area was by Reid (1934) who carefully tabulated hours devoted to non-
market work by economic and demographic characteristics. She found in-
come, family size and composition, and location of residence to be Im-
portant determinants of home production. More recently, Leibowitz (1974)
applied econometric techniques to study the influences on time spent in
home production. She found that the number and ages of children are
important influences on time spent in home production, but that produc-
tivity factors such as education have a minimal effect.
Recently, economists have become interested in the influences of
the price of time on the allocation of time within the household to non-
market activities. Using data from the 1964 National Study of Work and
Planning, Bloch (1973) estimated home production functions for husbands
and wives. He found that hours devoted to home production vary inversely
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with the wage rate and positively with the number of children. In a
more recent study, Wales and Woodland (1977) estimated a set of home
production and labor supply functions using a maximum likelihood simul-
taneous equation approach. They found that the wage rate was not a sig-
nificant determinant of hours of housework.
A common problem that arises in the estimation of home production
models is that the wage rate of persons with zero hours of market work
is not observed. This generally leads to biased estimates of the home
production function. A typical approach is the one taken by Bloch (1973)
and involves estimating the wage rate over the employed persons in the
sample and imputing the wage according to the personal characteristics
of the rest of the sample. It is well-known that this approach leads to
downward bias in the. estimates of the wage coefficient. Another approach,
which was adopted by Wales and Woodland (1977), is to exclude observa-
tions on persons whose wages are unobserved. However, this approach ad-
mits the possibility of censoring bias.
This study adopts an approach developed by Heckman (1976, 1979) for
dealing with the problem of the unobserved wage, Heckman's procedure
is a two-stage procedure which corrects for the bias introduced by cen-
soring the sample. This technique has been used successfully in differ-
ent contexts by Lee (1978), Fligstein and Wolf (1978), and others.
In section I, a theoretical model is developed and hypotheses de-
rived regarding the expected impact of taxation on home production ac-
tivity. In section II, the problems of estimation are discussed and in
section III, the results of the estimation are presented. Section IV
contains a discussion of the implications of the findings for tax policy
and section V summarizes the findings.
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I. Theoretical Expectations
In order to assess the expected effect of taxation on the alloca-
tion of time to hone production, a simple model is developed based on
the assumption of utility maximization subject to constraint. Utility
is assumed to be a positive function of family Income, Y, and a negative
function of hours of labor, L, and hours of home production, N. The
utility function takes the form:
U = U(Y,L,N)
and is assumed to be twice continuously dlfferentlable and convex. The
first partial derivatives of the function with respect to income, labor,
and home production are U„, U
,
and U„ and are positive, negative, and
negative, respectively.
Utility is maximized subject to an income constraint and a time
constraint. The income constraint may be stated as follows:
Y=wL+rN+V-T
vrtiere w is the wage rate for market work, r is the rate of return on
home production, V is the non-work income of the individual (and may in-
clude the wage income of other family members), and T is the family's
income tax obligation. The income tax is assumed to apply with a mar-
ginal rate, t, to work and property income but not to the imputed return
on home production.
The individual is also constrained by the total amount of time
available. The time constraint states that the total time available,
k, is fully exhausted in market work and home production activities:
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k = L + N.
Other uses of time such as charitable work, education, and recreation are
assumed exogenous to the model.
Each individual must choose the number of hours of home production
which maximizes his or her utility subject to the income and time con-
straints. Formally, the choice problem is
Max U(w(k - N) + rN + V - T, k - N, N).
N
Differentiating with respect to hours of home production yields the first
and second order conditions for utility maximization:
(1) [r - w(l-t)]UY - Uj^ + Ujj =
where t is the marginal rate of income tax, 6 is equal to [r - w(l-t)], and
U. . is the second partial derivative of the utility function with respect to
1 and j, 1, j = Y, L, N.
The effect of changes in non-work income, V, on hours of home pro-
duction may be derived by differentiating (1) with respect to V, substi-
tuting for M from (2), and solving for the partial derivative of home
production with respect to non-work income. This yields:
^ (l-t)6U^ (l-t)(U^^-U^)
''^'' 3t ~ - M "^ M
which cannot be signed at this level of generality.
The effect of an increase in the rate of income taxation on home pro-
duction is likewise indeterminate. Differentiating (1) with respect to t.
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substituting from (2) and (3) , and solving for the partial derivative of N
with respect to t yields:
wU
(/,\ m = Y (wtH-V) 3N
^^'' 3t ~ M (1-t) 3V
which is analogous to the Slutsky equation. The first term, the substitu-
tion effect, is positive since U^ is positive and M is negative. Hence,
the direction of the home production response to taxation depends on the
sign and magnitude of the income effect, which, in turn, depends on the sign
of the partial derivative of N with respect to V, If home production in-
creases In response to an Increase in non-work income, the income effect is
positive and the effect of an Increase in the marginal rate of taxation is
to increase home production activity. If home production decreases in re-
sponse to an increase in non-work income, the substitution and income effects
work in opposite directions and the effect of taxation on home production is
theoretically indeterminate. The empirical model described in the next
section attempts to resolve this indeterminacy and assess the impact of
taxation on time spent in home production.
II. The Empirical Model and Its Estimation
The theoretical model of the previous section suggests that hours of
home production will depend on the after-tax wage rate, the rate of return
on home production, and the non-work income of the individual. The following
function was selected to represent this relationship:
(5) N = bg + b^wCl-t) + b^w'd-t) + b^PCl-t) + b^Z + u
where the b's are constants, w' is the wage rate of the spouse, P is property
income, Z is a set of productivity variables, and u is a stochastic disturbance.
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The study utilizes a valuable source of data for studying home pro-
duction behavior, the Michigan Income Dynamics data for 1976, These data
are a cross-sectional sample of approximately 5,000 households and con-
tain information on hours of housework and child care, as well as more
conventional data on income, education, age, etc. They are especially
interesting for the study of home production activity since wives as
well as husbands were interviewed for the 1976 survey year.
From the husband's interview, data were available on his average
weekly hours spent on housework—such as time spent cooking, cleaning,
and other work around the house. The husband's average weekly hours of
housework were multiplied by 52 to put them on an annual basis. From
the wife's interview, data were available on her annual hours of house-
work, and her and her husband's annual hours of child care. Hours of
housework and hours of child care were added together to give total hours
of home production.
While wage rates were available in the data for the employed per-
sons in the sample, the expected wage for those not in the labor force
had to be imputed. A technique developed by Heckman (1976, 1979) was
used in order to obtain consistent estimates of the wage equation.
As a first step in adapting the Ueckman technique to our problem,
probit analysis is used to estimate the probability that an individual
participates in the labor force:
p(UT) = F(Y^X^, Y2X2)
where X_ is a set of explanatory variables for labor force participation,
X is a set of explanatory variables for the expected wage, and the y
are parameters of the probit analysis.
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The parameters of the probit estimation are then used to estimate
X, the inverse of the Mill's ratio, and the estimated value of X is used
as a regressor in the wage equation:
w = e^x^ + &^X + V
where v is a stochastic disturbance. The wage equation is then esti-
mated using ordinary least squares on the labor force participants in
the sample. Heckman has shown that the estimates of Q using this
technique are consistent.
The wage equation was then used to impute an expected disposable
wage to all wives in the sample. In the few cases where the husband's
wage was not available In the data, the observation was discarded from
the sample.
In order to put the wages on an after-tax basis, they were mtilti-
plied by one minus the marginal rate of tax which was available in the
data. In order that the marginal tax rate might be treated as an ex-
ogenous variable, it was assumed that the tax function is linear in the
vicinity of observed hours of work. A similar approach was taken by
Wales and Woodland (1977) who point out that the approach is justified
by the fact that the U.S. tax system contains rather wide brackets.
They feel that "for most households the misspecifIcation due to assiiming
the budget constraint is linear about the observed point will not be
great. "^
Property income was computed as a residual by subtracting the wage
income of the husband and wife from total family income. The variable
was then multiplied by one minus the marginal tax rate to put it on an
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after-tax basis. No attempt was made to impute non-money income or cap-
i
ital gains.
The other explanatory variables included the number and ages of
children in the family, age, and education. Four variables were con-
structed to account for the number of children in various age categories;
one to two years, three to five years, six to thirteen years, and four-
teen to seventeen years. Age was measured in years and education as the
number of years of school completed.
The model was estimated for both husbands and wives using ordinary
least squares on a subset of the sample. Only married households not
on welfare and with non-negative property income were selected. The
subsample consisted of 1523 observations. The results of the estima-
tion are reported in the next section.
III. The Results
The first step in the estimation was to estimate the probability
of the wife's labor force participation as a function of two sets of
explanatory variables: one for labor force participation and the other
for the expected wage. The resxilts of the probit estimation appear in
Table 1. The three variables explaining labor force participation are
the husband's disposable wage rate, property income after tax, and the
total number of children in the family. All three have the expected
influence on labor force participation. The other three variables, edu-
cation, experience, and experience squared, explain the expected wage.
The experience variable was computed by subtracting the number of years
of education plus five from age.
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TASLE 1
Probit Estimation of the Probability of Labor Force
Participation of Married Women
Characteristic Coefficient
Constant
Husband's disposable wage
Property income after tax
Education
Number of Cliildren
Experience
Experience squared
.111
-.123^
-.OOOOA^
.081^
-.158*
.039*
-.001a
-2 X Log Likelihood Ratio
Nxmber of Iterations
a
.135 E+03
4
Coefficient significant at the .95 confidence level.
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The parameters of the probit estimation were then used to calculate
X which was used to adjust for bias in the wage equation. The results
of the ordinary least squares estimation of the wage equation appear in
Table 2, Together with X, education, experience, and experience squared
were the regressors in this equation. This equation was then used to
impute a disposable wage to all women in the sample.
Table 3 shows the results of estimating equation (5) for married
women. Hours of housework, hours of child care, and total hours of home
production are the dependent variables. Examination of the coefficients
2
of determination, R , which appear near the bottom of the table, shows rea-
sonably good fits for cross-sectional data.
An increase in the wife's disposable wage leads her to reduce hours
of housework but increase hours of child care for a decrease in total
hours of home production. Increases in the husband's disposable wage
lead the wife to increase hours of housework but has no significant
effect on hours of child care or total hours of home production. An in-
crease in property income after tax leads to an increase in hours of
housework and to total hours of home production but has no significant
effect on hours of child care.
The number and ages of children are, as expected, important deter-
miners of time spent on housework and child care. Yoiinger children have
a more important influence on home production activity than do older
children. High school age children have a small positive impact on
hours of housework but do not significantly influence child care time.
In order to examine racial differences in behavior, the home pro-
duction equation was estimated separately for black and non-black married
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TABLE 2
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation of the Disposable
Wage Rate of Employed Married Women
Characteristic Coefficient
Constant -.974^
Education .281*
Experience . 017
Experience squared -.002
Probit X .110
R^ .107
P 28.7
Coefficient significant at the .95 confidence level.
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TABLE 3
Influences on Hours Spent in Housework, Child care, and Home Production
by Married Women
Hours of:
Characteristic Housework Child care Home Production
Constant
Wife's disposable wage
Husband's disposable wage
Property income after tax
Children 1-2 years
Children 3-5 years
Children 6-13 years
Children 14-17 years
r2
Coefficient significant at the .95 confidence level.
Coefficient significant at the .90 confidence level.
1577^ 43 1620*
-191.3* 65.9^ -125.3*
28.2*
-15.1 13.0
.029*
-.010 .018^
266* 321* 1088*
241* 375* 616*
150* 147* 297*
84*
-21 63
.121 .247 .283
29.8 71.2 85.5
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women. The results appear in Table 4. An F-test allowed us to reject
the hypothesis that the pareimeters of the regression equations for each
2
racial group are equal.
Two interesting differences appear in the estimations by race. One
is the finding that hours of home production activity by black wives
tend to be wage insensitive while non-black wives have a strong nega-
tive response to increases in their disposable wage rate. The other is
the differential influence of the number and ages of children on the
home production behavior of wives. Children at all age levels have a
greater impact on the home production activity of non-black wives than
of black wives. However, both black and non-black wives spend more time
in home production as the number of children increases. Further, the
magnitude of the impact declines as the children's ages increase.
The home production function was also estimated separately for black
3
and non-black husbands, with the results appearing in Table 5. Overall
husbands tend to be insensitive to changes in their own wages. Black
husbands, however, increase their hours of home production in response
to increases in their wife's disposable wage. Increases in property
income lead to significant reductions in the home production activity
of non-black husbands but do not influence blacks' behavior. The results
for husbands also show that, like wives, increases in home production
activity are associated with an increase in the number of children,
younger children having a greater impact than older children. Finally,
the impact of children on time spent in home production is greater for
non-blacks than for blacks.
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TABLE 4
Influences on Hours Spent in Home Production by Married Women
by Race
Characteris tic
Hours of Home Production
Blacks Nonblacks
Constant
Wife's disposable wage
Husband's disposable wage
Property income after tax
Children 1-2 years
Children 3-5 years
Children 6-13 years
Children 14-17 years
1522^
-24.5
-25.6
.032
575*
377
176'
-24
a
1794''
-191.0^
4.5
.015
1282*
713*
368*
123*
.126
6.7
Coefficient significant at the .95 confidence level.
Coefficient significant at the .90 confidence level.
.357
93.8
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TABLE 5
Influences on Hours Spent in Home Production by Married Men
by Race
Characteristic Blacks
Hours of Home Production
Nonblacks All
Constant 223
Wife's disposable wage 128.8'
Husband's disposable wage -18.0
Property income after tax -.014
Children 1-2 years 101^
Children 3-5 years 205^
Children 6-13 years 42
Children 14-17 years -48
229*"
32.2
-2.6
-.015^
302^
176^
93'
-1
240°
48.9^
-7.7
-.016^
254^
195^
31^
-10
. 095 . 145
4.9 28,7
Coefficient significant at the .95 confidence level.
.128
31.9
Coefficient significant at the .90 confidence level.
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In order to assess the importance of the tax effect, tax elastici-
ties showing the expected percentage change in hours of home production
for a one percent increase in the marginal tax rate were computed by
sex and race. These are presented in Table 6, A positive elasticity
implies that an increase in the marginal rate of tax is expected to have
a positive influence on hours of home production. The results show that
both black and non-black wives respond to increases in the tax rate by
increasing time spent in home production. The effect is substantially
larger for non-black women. On the other hand, both black and non-black
married men respond to tax increases by reducing their hours of home
production, the effect being greater for black men.
IV. Implications for Tax Policy
The case for the taxation of home production (or, alternatively,
allowance for expense) is usually argued on equity grounds. As Musgrave
(1959) points out, failure to tax the imputed value of non-market time
leads to unequal treatment of people in essentially equal positions.
Two families with equal full incomes (money income plus imputed home
production income) do not pay equal taxes if Imputed income is untaxed.
Further, the distribution of taxes over income classes may be distorted
by failure to tax imputed Income.
However, based on the findings of this study, a case for the taxa-
tion of home production can also be made on efficiency grounds. This
study showed that taxation distorts the home production decisions of
households, encouraging the home production activity of wives and dis-
couraging that of husbands. This distortion contributes to the excess
burden or deadweight loss of taxation.
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TABLE 6
Tax Elasticities by Race and Sex
Group Tax Elasticity
Black married women .018
Nonblack married women .080
All married women .040
Black married men -.110
Nonblack married men -.055
All married men -.050
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The direct taxation of home production activity under the income
tax is probably infeasible. Enforcement difficulties and problems of
deli mi ting home production from leisure activities (raising a flower
garden vs. raising a vegetable garden, for example) would have to be
overcome. Furthermore, the taxation of home production could cause in-
equity for families with low money resources for meeting their tax lia-
bility. In light of these difficxilties, it would appear that any adjust-
ment in the tax system must allow tax deductions or credits for the
expenses of hiring housework by those who work outside the home or permit
£in earned income allowance for two-job couples.
Since 1977, the U.S. tax system allowed two-earner families a 20
percent nonrefundable tax credit on expenditures up to $2,000 for the
care of a dependent while at work and up to $4,000 for two or more de-
pendents. Prior to 1977, all married couples with both the husband and
wife employed and having incomes less than $6,000 were able to deduct
up to $600 for the cost of the care of one child while they were at
work and up to $900 for two or more children.
An alternative to the child care deduction or credit for working
families is an earned income allowance for two-earner families. Break
and Pechman (1975) suggest that working couples might be given a special
deduction of 25 percent of the earnings of the spouse with the lower
earnings, up to a maximiim of $2,500; or they might be given a tax credit
of 10 percent of the earnings of the spouse with the lower earnings, up
to a maximum of $1,000. The U.S. Treasury in its recent study of U.S.
tax reform suggests that only 75 percent of the wage income of secondary
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earners be included in family income, with this exclusion limited to the
first $10,000 of earnings. In addition, the Treasury study advocates a
child care deduction equal to half the actual cost of child care up to a
limit of either $5,000 or the taxable earnings of the secondary worker,
o
which ever is smaller.
V. Conclusions
The purpose of this study was to explore the impact of taxation on
the home production behavior of households. Using data from the Michigan
Survey of Income Dynamics, a home production equation was estimated for
husbands and wives. The results of the study suggest that one effect
of taxation is to encourage the home production activity of wives and
discourage home production by husbands. The estimation results also
show that we can expect a larger tax response from non-black wives and
from black husbands.
Several important qualifications are in order. One involves the
assumption that the disposable wage rate is independent of hours worked.
If these two variables are not independent, then a simultaneous equation
problem arises. The problem of dependence is a special concern in this
study because the marginal tax rate in a progressive tax system is a
function of income, which, in turn, depends on hours worked. It is hoped
that using a bracket tax system with rather wide brackets minimized the
seriousness of this problem.
One might also question whether or not the disposable wage rate
variable should be decomposed into a gross wage and a tax variable. This
was done in a study by Rosen (1976) in order to measure the strength of
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"tax illusion" among married women. Rosen found no evidence of tax
illusion with respect to the work decision of married women. Hence, no
attempt was made in this study to decompose the disposable wage rate
variable.
Finally, an interdependence between the disposable wage rates, after-
tax property income, smd the number of children may cause an estimation
problem. As the number of tax exemptions increases with the number of
children, taxable income decreases and the marginal tax rate decreases.
This, in turn, affects the disposable wage rates and after-tax income.
This interdependence could cause complications in the estimation due to
multi-collinearity among the explanatory variables. An examination of
the correlation coefficients, however, suggests this is not a serious
problem. The interdependence coiild also cause a problem in measuring
the Impact of an additional child on hours of work. The addition of a
child not only has an effect on time allocation equal to the coefficient
of the children variable, it also has an effect on time allocation via
the influences of the marginal tax rate on the disposable wage rates
and on after-tax property income. This indirect effect was disregarded
in the present study but suggests the need for future research.
M/D/288
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Footnotes
Vales and Woodland (1977), p. 118.
^See Kmenta (1971), p. 373.
3
An F-test led to a rejection of the hypothesis the parameters of the
black and non-black regression equations are equal.
4
The tax elasticities were computed according to the following formula:
^=f -1= C-b.w-b^W -b3P) . t .N-^
where the variables were evaluated at their means.
See Musgrave (1959), p. 170.
See Due and Friedlaender (1977), pp. 225-6, for a discussion of the
important problems in taxing self-produced goods.
Break and Peckman (1975), p. 26.
Q
U.S. Treasury, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform (1977), p. 105.
-22-
References
Bloch, F. (1973), "The Allocation of Time to Market and Non-market Work
Within a Family Unit," Institute for Mathematical Studies in the
Social Sciences, Technical Report No. 114.
Break, G. and Pechman, J. A. (1975), Federal Tax Reform; The Impossible
Dream? , Washington: Brookings Institution.
Due, J.F. and Friedlaender , A. F. (1977) Government Finance; Economics
of the Public Sector , Homewood; Irwin.
Fligstein, N. and Wolf, W. (1978) , "Sex Similarities in Occupational
Status Attainment; Are the Results Due to the Restriction of the
Sample to Employed Women?" Social Science Research , 7, 197-212.
Heckman, J. (1976), "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error,"
Rand Corporation Report, R-1984-HEW.
,
(1979), "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error,"
Econometrica , 47, 153-161.
Kmenta, J. (1971), Elements of Econometrics , New York: Macmillan.
Lee, L.F. (1978), "Unionism and Wage Rates: A Simultaneous Equations
Model with Qualitative and Limited Dependent Variables,"
International Economic Review , 19, 415-433.
Leibowitz, A. (1974), "Education and Home Production," American
Economic Review , 64, 243-250.
^alsgrave, R.A. (1959), The Theory of Public Finance , New York: McGraw-
Hill.
Reid, M.G. (1934), Economics of Household Production , New York: Wiley.
Rosen, H.S. (1976), "Taxes in a Labor Supply Itodel with Joint Wage-
Hours Determination," Econometrica , 44, 486-507.
U.S. Treasury (1977), Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform , Washington:
Department of the Treasury.
Wales, T.J. and Woodland, A.D. (1977), "Estimation of the Allocation of
Time for Work, Leisure, and Housework," Econometrica, 45, 115-132.




